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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, AND  






 A funny thing happened to administrative law in the United States over the course 
of the twentieth century.  It emerged at the century’s beginning, in response to the growth 
in national administrative government.
2
  The 1946 enactment of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) represented an acknowledgement that the administrative state was 
here to stay and was based on an intensive study of different federal agencies’ practices.
3
  
Subsequent administrative law transformations were also tied to changes in how agencies 
operate, for example with expansion in the procedural requirements for notice and 
comment rulemaking coming in response to increased use of such rulemaking by 
agencies.
4
  Centralized regulatory review and other forms of presidential direction, 
perhaps the most significant administrative development of the last decades of the 




 In short, from its birth administrative law has claimed a close connection to 
governmental practice.   But in fact as administrative law has grown and matured it has 
moved further away from critical aspects of how agencies function.  As many have noted, 
administrative law focuses almost entirely on external dimensions of administrative 
action, and the external dimensions it targets are increasingly not the main drivers of 
administrative action.
6
  To be sure, courts police agency conformity with procedural 
requirements imposed by the APA, other statutes and regulations, and constitutional due 
                                              
1
 Stanley H. Fuld Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; Public Member, Administrative Conference of the 
United States. 
2
 See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1671-72 
(1975); see also JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION:  THE LOST ONE HUNDRED 
YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 3-17 (2012)(noting the conventional view that administrative 
government and administrative law came into being at the national level in the late nineteenth century, but arguing 
that both are actually longstanding features that go back to the nation’s founding). 
3
For a detailed history of the APA’s enactment, see George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative 
Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1557 (1996); see also Walter Gellhorn, The 
Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings, 72 Va. L. Rev. 219, 224-29 (1986) (describing the AG committee’s 
work). 
4
 See Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, GW __.  New statutes mandating use of 
rulemaking and imposing new procedural requirements, such as the CAA, also played a significant role.  ID? 
5
 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2281-2319 (2001) (describing the forms 
and increasing importance of presidential administration); Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in 
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461, 485-92 (2003) (describing turn to the presidential control model in 
administrative and constitutional law scholarship); see also Don Bradford Hardin Jr, Why Cost-Benefit Analysis? A 
Question (and Some Answers) about the Legal Academy, 59 Ala L Rev 1135, 1136-37 (2008) (documenting a 
dramatic rise in legal scholarship related to cost-benefit analysis, the key component of centralized regulatory 
review). 
6
 See infra TAN notes 19-24. 
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process, but these legal mandates govern only a small part of agency operations.
7
  Courts 
insistently exclude more systemic aspects of agency functioning from their purview and 
from administrative law doctrines.
8
 Key internal agency dynamics—such as planning, 
assessment, oversight mechanisms and managerial methods, budgeting, personnel 
practices, reliance on private contractors, and the like—are left instead to the public 
administration.  As a result, despite their common concern with administrative agencies, 
the fields of administrative law and public administration interact at largely as passing 
strangers, acknowledging each other’s existence but almost never engaging in any 
sustained interchange. 
 
 The causes of administrative law’s separation from public administration are 
complex—rooted in historical field development, ideological commitments, institutional 
role, constitutional principle and good old-fashioned turf protection.   This separation 
reflects administrative law’s traditional court-centric focus, and much can be said for 
keeping the courts out of the internal world of agency functioning.  Yet administrative 
law’s growing disconnect from actual government practices is cause for concern.  This 
disconnect perpetuates a false image of how agencies operate and the role of internal 
administration.  In a number of contexts internal administration is the linchpin for 
ensuring accountable government, given obstacles to external constraint through 
congressional oversight or judicial review.
9
  Moreover, whether intentional or not, 
administrative law affects internal agency operations in significant ways.  Hence, 
administrative law’s inattention to public administration risks impeding development of 
good administrative practices and worse incentivizing agencies to adopt bad ones—at a 
time when the importance of strong internal administration is only growing. 
 
 Enter the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS).  Although the 
separation of administrative law from public administration is longstanding, there have 
been rare instances of linkage between the two.  ACUS represents one such instance.  Not 
only does its membership bridge the internal-external divide, consisting of agency 
officials and public members from outside of government, but the projects it undertakes 
also span the worlds of administrative law and public administration.  ACUS is thus 
ideally situated to address the growing disconnect between these two fields, studying how 
administrative law affects internal agency operations and assessing whether—and how—
administrative law might be used to improve public administration. 
 
  
                                              
7
 See Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the APA Administrative, 89 Cornell L Rev 95, 96-97, 105-11  (2001); 
William Simon, The Organizational Premises of Administrative Law, 77 Law & Contemp. Probs. (forthcoming 
2014), draft at 1-5, 13-17. 
8
 See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 Yale L. J. __(forthcoming 2015), draft at 16-28. 
9
 See id., at 9-16. 





I.  THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DIVIDE 
 
 Administrative law and public administration scholars both bemoan the disconnect 
between their fields, a disconnect evident from comparing key agency internal practices 
and administrative law doctrines.  The historical roots of this divide trace back to both 
fields’ origins in the United States at the outset of the twentieth century.  But over time 
the divide has expanded and become entrenched, based today more expressly on 
separation of powers principles, concerns about the impact of judicial review on agency 
functioning, and the dominance of managerialist approaches to public administration.   
 
A. Manifestations of the Administrative Law-Public Administration Divide 
 
At first glance, the claim that administrative law is divorced from how agencies 
actually function seems patently false.  After all, a core focus of the APA—the nation’s 
most foundational administrative law enactment—is agency process, setting out basic 
procedural requirements for agencies to follow.
10
  Federal courts in turn have penned an 
endless number of administrative law decisions interpreting those requirements, and 
learning the details of the resultant doctrines is one of the joys experienced by many a 
student of administrative law.  Moreover, study of centralized White House regulatory 
review, implemented through the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and a central factor today in major 
rulemakings, is another administrative law staple.
11
  And increasingly, administrative law 
scholars are turning their attention to important internal dynamics that shape how 
agencies operate, such as an agency’s internal organization and design or the use of 




Yet appearances can be deceiving.  A key feature of the APA is that it represents 
external controls, imposed by statute and elaborated on by courts.  Process requirements 
developed by agencies themselves rarely rise to the fore in administrative law, except 
with respect to whether those requirements are judicially enforceable.
13
  Despite its 
central importance to how federal agencies function today, centralized regulatory review 
                                              
10
 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§553-557. 
11
 See, e.g., PETER L. STRAUSS, ET AL, GELLHORN & BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:  CASES AND COMMENTS 213-41, 
685-717 (11
th
 ed 2011) (detailing instances of presidential direction and review as well as connected scholarship); 
see also sourced cited supra note 5. 
12
 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1131 
(2012); Jacob Gersen, Designing Agencies, in Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law 333 (Daniel A. 
Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition And Institutional 
Design,124 Harv. L. Rev. 1422 (2011). 
13
 See Elizabeth Magill, Foreword:  Agency Self-Regulation, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 859, 860-61, 873-91 (2009); 
see also Strauss, supra note 11, at 203-07, 926-34 (describing internal agency processes connected to rulemaking 
and with respect to judicial review). 





and presidential direction remains remarkably absent from administrative law decisions.
14
  
The same is true of other significant internal agency features, such as prioritysetting and 
planning processes or the role of career officials in agency decisionmaking.
15
  Perhaps the 
clearest evidence of this doctrinal absence is offered by Lujan v. National Wildlife 
Federation, where the Supreme Court ruled it lacked jurisdiction over a challenge to the 
Bureau of Land Management’s failure to undertake programmatic and planning activities 
with respect to public lands.  According to the Court, such activities were too 
“wholesale” or systematic to come within the scope of judicial review, which it deemed 
limited to “discrete” agency actions.
16
  In a subsequent decision the Court tied this 
exclusion even more firmly to terms of the APA’s grant of jurisdiction, but it has also 
sometimes held general or programmatic challenges as barred on constitutional standing 
grounds.
17
   
 
Administrative law scholars are increasingly arguing that the exclusion of these 
systemic internal features means that administrative law is becoming separated from the 
main drivers of agency functioning.  According to these scholars, classical or canonical 
administrative law—defined generally as “the text and judicial elaboration of the [APA] 
and related constitutional doctrine”— “do not reach some of the most practically 
important official conduct”
18
 and “can seem like a minor presence in the modern 
regulatory process.”
19
  William Simon argues that administrative law traditionally 
emphasizes top-down, bureaucratic delegations and specific acts of rulemaking.  Not only 
does this approach leave vast areas of agency discretion unregulated, it is at odds with 
contemporary models of administration, which focus on overall planning and monitoring 
and derive legitimacy from transparency and processes for continuous revision.
20
  Dan 
Farber and Anne O’Connell agree that current administrative law is premised on a “lost 
world,” one in which a statutorily-authorized agency implements statutory requirements 
pursuant to reasoned consideration of the requirements and designated evidence under 
mandated procedures, with the agency’s determination subsequently being reviewable by 
courts.  “The reality of the modern administrative state,” however, is quite different:  
executive directives as well as statutory requirements are in play; multiple agencies (often 
lacking confirmed leaders) are charged with implementation yet in practice authority may 
                                              
14
 See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 1137,  
1138-39, 1155-57 (2014); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 
Yale L.J. 2, 7, 18-23 (2009). 
15
 See Rubin, supra note , at 97; Sidney A. Shapiro, Why Administrative Law Misunderstands How Government 
Works:  The Missing Institutional Analysis, 53 Washburn L.J. 1, 10-13, 23-24 (2013); Simon, supra note 7, at 17-
23. 
16
 497 U.S. 871, 891-94 (1990). 
17
 See, e.g., Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 61-67 (2004); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 
U.S. 343, 349 (1996); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759-60 (1984). 
18
 Simon, supra note 7, at 5.  
19
 Farber & O’Connell, supra note 14, at 1138. 
20
 Simon, supra note 7, at 5-38. 





rest elsewhere, in particular in the hands of OIRA and White House staff; mandated 
procedures are avoided; political as opposed to statutory factors drive decisionmaking 
and little judicial oversight is available.
21
   
 
 Edward Rubin takes the argument even further, contending that “the APA was out 
of date at the time it was enacted” because its requirements “are derived from an 
essentially judicial concept of governance in which laws are discovered rather than 
invented and policy making is always incremental,” thereby ignoring the distinctive 
features of the administrative process and leaving key activities “such as priority setting, 
resource allocation, research, planning, targeting, guidance, and strategic enforcement” 
either “essentially unregulated or subject[ed] … to inappropriate procedural rigidities.”
22
  
Like Rubin, Sidney Shapiro faults administrative law for failing to heed the insights of 
public administration.  In Shapiro’s view, administrative law is excessively focus in on 
“outside-in accountability,” specifically political and legal controls external to an agency, 
and ignores the ways that “hierarchy …, institutional norms, and professionalism 
promote accountability from inside an agency.”
23
  Jerry Mashaw puts the point 
particularly well:  
 
[W]e tend to think of our administrative constitution as a set of external 
constraints on agencies … [and] relentlessly analyze these external 
constraints as if they were the major determinants of agency efficiency, 
procedural fairness, and legal legitimacy.  Yet in many ways it is the 
internal law of administration—the memoranda, guidelines, circulars, and 





Strikingly, some public administration scholars also critique the disconnect 
between administrative law and public administration.  But they approach this disconnect 
from the opposite direction, faulting their field for its refusal to take seriously the central 
                                              
21
 Farber & O’Connell, supra note 14, at 1154-73. 
22
 Rubin, supra note 7, at 96. 
23
 Shapiro, supra note 15, at 1.  Note that although these scholars agree that administrative law fails to encompass 
key dimensions of modern administration, they take somewhat different stances on the specific features of this 
mismatch.  In particular, whereas Simon argues that current administrative is too bureaucratic and hierarchial in its 
focus and Farber and O’Connell describe it as failing to acknowledge the role of presidential and executive branch  
directives, Shapiro’s complaint is that administrative law does not give hierarchy enough weight and is too focused 
on presidential oversight.  Compare Simon, supra note 7, at 9-17; Farber & O’Connell, supra note 14, at 1154-59, 
with Shapiro, supra note 15, at   11-25; see also Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the 
Administrative Presidency:  Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. Miami L. Rev. 577, 585-87 (2011) 
(detailing the benefits of bureaucratic control). This discrepancy may result from the fact that Shapiro is targeting 
administrative law scholarship somewhat more than administrative law’s statutory and doctrinal manifestations, but 
in any event these differences do not take away from their shared agreement that administrative law fails to 
acknowledge important internal administrative features than drive agency behavior. 
24
 MASHAW, supra note 2, at 313. 





role of public law in public administration.  Thus, Laurence Lynn critiques public 
administration’s “‘anti-legal temper,’”
25
 arguing that “a broad consensus within public 
administration appears to hold that law is one of many environmental constraints on 
administrative discretion rather than its source” and give “short shrift to the relationship 
between law and administration.”
26
  Such dismissals of law are misguided not just 
because of the myriad ways that law impinges on administration, but also because “public 
administrators necessarily play an essential role in defining what the rule of law means in 
practice.”
27
  Other public administration scholars similarly contend that “the basic theory 
guiding governmental organization and management … is to be found in public law” and 





 B. Historical Antecedents 
 
 The current divide between administrative law and public administration is not a 
new phenomenon, but dates back to when both fields were being born as areas of 
academic study and practice at the beginning of the twentieth century.  Early scholars of 
administrative law disagreed in fundamental ways about how the field should develop.  
Some, in particular Frank Goodnow and Ernest Freund—both political scientists as well 
as legal academics—saw features of internal administration as a core part of 
administrative law’s ambit.
29
  Thus Goodnow began his 1905 treatise on administrative 
law with a disquisition on the meaning of administration, along with an insistence on 
paying attention to how government actually operates: 
 
Since administration and administrative law have to do with the 
governmental system in operation, or, in other words, with the actual 
operations of political life, it is absolutely necessary that the study of these 
subjects take into account no merely the formal governmental system as it 
is outlined in charters of government and legal rules, but, as well, those 
                                              
25
 The phrase originated with DWIGHT WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE:  A STUDY OF THE PUBLIC THEORY OF 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 80 (1948).  See Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., Restoring the Rule of Law to Public 
Administration:  What Frank Goodnow Got Right and Leonard White Didn’t, Pub. Admin. Rev. Sept/Oct 2009 at 
803. 
26
 Lynn, supra note 25, at 803. 
27
 Id. at 805, 808-809; see also ANTHONY M. BERTELLI & LAURENCE E. LYNN, JR., MADISON’S MANAGERS:  PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 73 (2003).  (“By ignoring [law], public administration contributes to its 
own powerlessness.”) 
28
 See Ronald S. Moe & Robert S. Gilmour, Rediscovering the Principles of Public Administration:  The Neglected 
Foundation of Public Law, 55 Pub. Admin. Rev. 135, 135-136 (Mar/Apr 1995); see also Lynn, supra note 25, at 
805-06 (quoting public administration scholars who emphasize public law). 
29
 William C. Chase, The American Law School and the Rise of Administrative Government 47-59 (1982)  Thomas 
W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative 
Law, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 939, 974 (2011). 





extralegal conditions and practices which, it has been shown, have such an 




Goodnow followed this introduction with a detailed review of the organization of 
administration, including the organization of executive departments and chief executive 
authority, turning to judicial control of administration only at the end.
31
  Freund, in turn, 
“sought to bridge what he saw as the differentiated study of administrative organization 
and administrative powers, the former of which focused on optimizing public 
administration and the latter of which performed the ‘more strictly legal’ task of 
protecting ‘right and justice.’”
32
  Freund was an advocate of greater external constraints 
on administrative discretion, in particular more detailed legislative specification to guide 
agency decisionmaking.  But he also expressly highlighted the potential benefits of 
internal administrative systems of control, which he emphasized operate constantly on 
subordinate officers and—unlike courts —can fully address questions of the wisdom and 
expediency of discretionary action.
33
  Acknowledging the tendency to see “administrative 
law …[as] primarily judicial law controlling the administration,” he urged applying the 
term as well “to a body of principles produced by administration” on the ground that 




Goodnow and Freund were not alone.  Another leading early administrative law 
scholar, Bruce Wyman, framed his 1903 treatise around a distinction between internal 
and external administrative law.  According to Wyman, “[e]xternal administrative law 
deals with the relations of the administration or officers with citizens,” while “[i]nternal 
administrative law is concerned with the relations of officers with each other, or with the 
administration.”
35
  Such a clear external-internal distinction could be seen to set the 
groundwork for downplaying the internal dimension—more hidden to begin with and less 
familiar to lawyers than courts—in favor of the external.
36
  But Wyman expressly 
acknowledged the internal aspects of administration as part of administrative law, 
                                              
30
 FRANK J. GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 9 (1905). 
31
 Id. at v-xii; see also Mark Fenster, The Birth of a “Logical System”:  Thurman Arnold and the Making of Modern 
Administrative Law, 84 Or. L. Rev. 69, 77 (2005) (describing Goodnow’s approach as “largely an internal one” that 
“focused less on common law development by the judiciary”). 
32
 See Fenster, supra note31, at 78 (quoting Ernst Freund, Administrative Law, 1 Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences 452, 455 (Edwin R. A. Seligman, ed. 1932).) 
33
 Ernst Freund, The Law of Administration in America, 9 Pol. Sci. Q.403, 414-15, 419 (1894); see also Dan Ernst at 
175, 179 
34
 Ernst Freund, Administrative Law, in Edwin R. A. Seligman ed., Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences 454-55 
(1930) 
35
 BRUCE WYMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4, 9-14 (1905). 
36
 See CHASE, supra note 29, at 61-71; see also Lynn, supra note 25, at 806 (identifying Wyman as reflecting an anti-
legal approach that sought to leave administrative discretion unconstrained by rules). 





insisting that “[t]ogether, the external law and the internal law make up the law of 
administration.”
37
   
 
 Yet by the late 1920s and early 1930s, when John Dickinson, Felix Frankfurter 
and John Davidson penned their takes on administrative law, this acknowledgement of 
internal administration as part of administrative law had largely disappeared.
38
  Courts 
were now ascendant:  Dickinson’s volume, for example, contained detailed accounts of 
the nature and importance of the courts in administrative action and no discussion of 
topics not relating to judicial review.
39
  According to Thomas Merrill, Dickinson’s 
approach marked the adoption of a new appellate model of judicial review, which 
extended the reach of the courts into areas previously left to agency discretion.
40
  But it 
also represented the seeming removal of questions that did not lend themselves to judicial 
involvement from administrative law’s ken—and thus the internal organizational issues 
that engaged Goodnow, Freund, and Wyman are notably absent.
41
  Frankfurter’s 
approach was broader.  He underscored the importance of internal administrative 
features, such as “a highly professionalized civil service, an adequate technique of 
administrative application of legal standards, [and] a flexible, appropriate, and 
economical procedure.”
42
  Frankfurter also defined administrative law in encompassing 
terms: “administrative law deals with the field of legal control exercised by law 
administering agencies other than courts, and the field of control exercised by courts over 
such agencies.”
43
 Yet his and Davidson’s casebook similarly excludes discussion of 
internal agency features in favor of an extensive analysis of judicial controls on an 
agency-by-agency basis and materials on separation of powers.
44
   
                                              
37
 WYMAN, supra note 35, at __.  Moreover, Wyman emphasized that the focus of internal administrative law is 
administration, or the process and methods by which an administration acts and its officers engage in common 
action.  Id. at 14; see also id. at 15 (“[t]he purpose of the law of administration . . . is the science of common 
action.”). 
38
 Jerry Mashaw has written eloquently of the importance of internal administrative law and the limitations of a 
court centered perspective.  See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 2. 
39
 JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES XI-XIII (1927). 
40
 See Merrill, supra note 29, at 972-79. 
41
 Id. at 973.  Merrill notes that despite Dickinson’s sole focus on the court-agency relationship “[q]uite likely [he] 
had no intention of suggesting there is nothing else to administrative law besides the issue of judicial review—this 
was simply what he chose to write about.” Id.   
42
 Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 614, 618 (1927); see also id. at 620-21 
(arguing that in-depth scientific study of how different agencies operate a central precondition for development of 
administrative law); Ernst, supra note 33 at 180-81 
43
 Frankfurter, supra note 42, at 615. 
44
 See Felix Frankfurter & J. Forester Davidson, Cases and Materials on Administrative Law ix (1932); Chase, supra 
note 29, at 14-17; see also Oliver P. Field, The Study of Administrative Law:  A Review and A Proposal, 18 Iowa L. 
Rev. 233, 236 (1932)(“[Frankfurter and Davison’s casebook} is not a casebook on administrative law.  …[I]t is a 
fine collection of cases on the separation and delegation of powers, and judicial review of administrative action.”). 
see also John F. Davidson, Administration and Judicial Self-Limitation, 4 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 291, 296-99 (1936) 
(defining administrative law as “a body of principles followed by the regular courts of law in deciding disputes as to 
the proper relationship between the three powers of government or between an agency or bureau of the government 
 






 A few decades on, the identification of administrative law with judicial review had 
intensified.  To be sure, attention to internal administrative practice remained an 
important theme during the New Deal period.  James Landis famously defended the New 
Deal administrative state with an emphasis on administrative process and the argument 
for how agencies’ internal combination of different functions made them far better 
equipped to address the major problems of day than courts.
45
  And the intensive study of 
agencies’ actual practices which led to the enactment of the APA demonstrated continued 
concern with internal administrative operations.
46
  Moreover, the post-New Deal period 
was one of significant deference to agencies and restrained judicial scrutiny.
47
  Still, these 
developments did not undermine the increasing identification of administrative law in 
terms of external and particularly judicial controls, perhaps best captured by the title of 
Louis Jaffe’s dominant treatise, Judicial Control of Administrative Action.
48
  Indeed, the 
APA arguably reinforced this trend, with its imposition of transsubstantive procedural 
requirements that applied to all agencies and were enforced by courts.    
 
 Why the internal dimensions of administration were initially dropped from 
administrative law is a complicated question, and one that implicates forces that go 
beyond the field of administrative law.  William Chase traces early resistance to broader 
efforts by legal academia to systematize law teaching in the form of the Llangdellian case 
method.  According to Chase, “[t]his model was intensely committed to the study and 
teaching of the work product of the traditional courts, and it was just as intensely biased 
against the teaching of a topic like administrative law and … the study of noncourt 
decisions which that topic’s full scholarly development would require.”
49
  The 
valorization of courts over administration also reflected a traditional common law 
identification of the rule of law with judicial control.  This identification, and 
understanding of administrative law as exempting government officials  from “the 
ordinary law of the land . . . [and] the jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals” underlay A.V. 
Dicey’s famous renunciation of administrative law as “opposed to all English ideas” and 
                                                                                                                                                  
and individual[s]” and arguing that similar rules and principles were not yet available from agencies in formulating 
their decisions). 
45
 James M. Landis, The Administrative Process 10-12, 24-46 (1938). 
46
 MASHAW, supra note 2, at 279. 
47
 See Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference:  Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative 
Law, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 399, 429-40 (2007) 
48
 LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965); Merrill, supra note 29, at 973; Fensler, 
supra note 31, at 82-84 (identifying the view “that legal academic research and teaching should focus on the 
traditional student of the judicial role in the administrative process---that is, on the limited judicial review of 
administrative agencies rather than on the bureaucratic operations and decisionmaking of the agencies themselves” 
as “a core assumption of early administrative law scholars” such as Dickinson, Frankfurter, and Landis).  Fensler 
identifies Thurman Arnold as an administrative law theorist of this period who offered a model of administrative law 
that emphasized greater partnership between administrators and courts.  See id at 103-16. 
49
 CHASE, supra note 29, at 20. 





“unknown to English judges and counsel.”
50
  Defending administrative law’s legitimacy 
against Dicey’s attack underlay Wyman’s distinction of external administrative law—the 
law of the land, applicable to government officers as well as private citizens—from 
internal administrative law as well as his insistence that external administrative law 
trumped if in conflict with internal law.
51
  Indeed, the legitimacy not just administrative 
law but of administrative governance was at issue.  Emphasizing the role of judicial 
review helped portray the expanding administrative state as compatible with 




 Equally important were broader ideological commitments of the time, in particular 
the Progressives’ deep skepticism of the courts and their commitment to making 
professional expertise the basis of governmental decisionmaking rather than politics.
53
  
This skepticism underlay enactment of administrative systems to replace common law 
rules and was further reinforced by the ways courts impeded new administrative 
regulation.  The experience of the Lochner era made Frankfurter and his fellow New Deal 
sympathizers deeply suspicious of the courts and intent on curtailing their involvement in 
administrative policy choices.
54
  Distinguishing internal administration from 
administrative law served as a means of precluding judicial involvement in the former, 
even if it also served to reinforce the identification of administrative law with judicially 
enforced constraints.  Emphasis on the need for expert exercise of discretion for 
successful completion of governmental tasks, meanwhile, reinforced the inclination to 
limit judicial involvement in the substance of administration.
55
   Early administrative law 
scholars disagreed fundamentally over whether administrative discretion was bane or 
benefit:  Freund viewed development of precise substantive rules, whether by legislatures 
or administrative superiors, to be inevitable and critical to preventing administrative 
abuse, whereas Frankfurter embraced discretion as essential for effective administrative 
government.
56
  But as even Freund acknowledged, courts were ill-equipped to review 
                                              
50
 A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 330 (10
th
 ed. 1959) 
51
 WYMAN, supra note 35, at 4-13. 
52
 See Jaffe, supra note 48, at 320 (“The availability of judicial review is the necessary condition, psychologically if 
not logically, of a system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid.”).As Merrill has 
noted, however, judicial review could be seen to raise concerns of excessive judicial entanglement with the proper 
work of the political branches, a concern alleviated by development of the appellate review model in this period. See 
Merrill, supra note 29, at 992-100. 
53
 See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 151, 158-59 (1930); Fenster, supra note 31, at 80-
85; Shapiro & Wright, supra note 23, at 98. 
54
 See Chase, supra note 29. 141-46; Schiller, supra note 47, at 403-04, 407-12; Mark Tushnet, Administrative Law 
in the 1930s:  The Supreme Court’s Accommodation of Progressive Legal Theory, 60 Duke L.J. 1565, 1591 (2011). 
55
 Chase, supra note 29, at 12-17; Fensler, supra at 80-84; Schiller, supra note 54, at 415-20; Tushnet, supra note 54, 
at 1572-73, 1587-88 
56
 See Daniel R. Ernst, Ernst Freund, Felix Frankfurter, and the American Rechtsstaat, 23 Stud. In Am. Pol. Devt. 
171, 173, 179, 185, 187-89 (2009); FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 150-51, 154-62 (1930) 





questions of the propriety, and thus embrace of administrative discretion served to 




 The progressive commitment to expert administration separate from politics also 
led to the birth of the field of public administration.  Woodrow Wilson’s founding essay, 
The Study of Administration, insisted on the need to develop “the eminently practical 
science of administration.”
58
  Although Wilson is famous for insisting on a distinction 
between administration and politics, he also went to pains to distinguish administration 
and law, bemoaning undue attention to the questions of lawmaking and constitutional 
framing at the expense of law implementation.
59
  And he defined the object of 
administration in decidedly non-legal, policy laden terms—as being “to discover, first, 
what government can properly and successfully do, and, secondly, how it can do these 
proper things with the utmost possible efficiency and the least possible cost either of 
money or energy.”
60
  Leonard White, author of the first public administration textbook in 
1926, argued that “the study of administration should start from the base of management 
rather than the foundation of law.”
61
  Here, too, exclusion of law was intended to protect 
administrative exercise of discretion from judicial interference and the restrictions of a 
rule-bound approach.
62
   
 
 Public administration’s efforts to differentiate itself from law underscores yet 
another force behind the exclusion of administration from administrative law:  good old-
fashioned turf protection, on the part of lawyers and public administration scholars alike.  
Defining administrative law in terms of external judicial controls made it centrally an 
arena for those with legal training and expertise, and thus preserved a new field for legal 
dominance.
63
  At the same time, pulling administration out of law’s ambit was central to 
justifying the existence of new schools of public administration and of public 
administration as a distinct field of inquiry.
64
  Yet it merits emphasis that some founding 
figures in the field of public administration took an opposite approach and underscored 
its connection to administrative law.  Perhaps not surprisingly, two leading examples 
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were Frank Goodnow and Ernst Freund.
65
  They were joined by Marshall Dimock, who 
argued for a closer association between administrative law, public administration, and 
political science, stating that “[p]ublic administration and administrative law are as 




 By the public interest era of the 1960s and 1970s, progressive faith in expert 
administration and broad discretion had become a relic of the past, replaced by growing 
skepticism of agencies as captured by regulated interests, unwilling to take seriously new 
public interest legislation, and ineffectual regulators to boot.  On this skeptical view, 
court oversight emerged as a critical check on unaccountable and arbitrary 
administration.   Prime evidence of the courts’ centrality was their expansion of the 
APA’s rulemaking requirements and development of searching hard look review to 
replace the deferential arbitrary and capricious scrutiny of the APA’s early years. The 
identification of administrative law with judicial review was now complete. 
 
 C. Contemporary Contributing Forces  
 
 This history explains why administrative law and internal administration initially 
diverged, but not why that divergence continues today.  This ongoing divide is perplexing 
given the resultant contemporary criticisms of administrative law as out of touch with 
actual administrative practice.
67
  Even more pointed are efforts by scholars to 
demonstrate the existence and significance of internal administrative law.  A seminal 
force here is Jerry Mashaw, whose recent book Creating the Administrative Constitution 
demonstrates internal administrative law’s longstanding pedigree.
68
  Others have 
analyzed the importance of institutional design to how agencies operate, and for decades 
both constitutional and administrative scholars have emphasized the centrality of internal 
executive branch oversight to agency functioning and accountability.
69
  Events in the 
world have reinforced this emphasis on internal administration.  Perhaps no sphere 
demonstrates the centrality of internal administration more than national security, where 
limited judicial review combined with substantially expanded governmental activity post 
9-11 have brought public attention repeatedly to the role of internal controls.
70
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 To some extent, the continuing divide between administrative law and internal 
administration stems from the same forces that underlay the divide’s initial creation.  One 
major factor is skepticism about the value of judicial review.  This skepticism reflects 
concerns about the courts’ ability to understand the complexity involved in regulatory 
choices as well as their political biases, and is further fueled by claims that the heightened 
judicial scrutiny born during the public interest era has severely hampered agencies’ 
ability to function.
71
   The shift in emphasis to centralized oversight and accountability 
through the President stems in part from this judicial skepticism,
72
 and thus it is perhaps 
not surprising that such internal executive branch controls do not surface in judicial 
decisions.  Nor, moreover, has the executive branch encouraged a melding of presidential 
oversight with judicial review, prominently declaring that key executive branch 





 Another contributing factor is continued image of law as rules and constraints that 
are externally imposed.  There is a circularity here—internal administration is excluded 
from the ambit of administrative law because internal administrative features and 
processes are not seen as law.  But nonetheless this image of law as externally binding 
rules—an image reinforced by the now lengthy period that internal administration and 
administrative law have been separated—continues to stand as an obstacle to bringing 
internal administration within administrative law’s ambit.
74
 Both characteristics—law as 
external constraints and law as rules—also explains the resistance to see centralized 
executive branch controls or congressional oversight processes other than statutes as law 
as opposed to politics.
75
  Meanwhile, public administration’s turn towards greater 
managerialism, relying on general management and organizational principles drawn from 
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fields of business and private organizations, makes efforts to inject the distinctly public 




 Constitutional separation of powers concerns represent a final—and today perhaps 
most significant—force behind preserving the administrative law and public 
administration divide.  The Supreme Court often justifies its refusal to address systematic 
administrative features and processes on the grounds that to do so would be to overstep 
the judicial role.  As Justice Scalia put the point in National Wildlife Foundation, 
individuals “cannot seek wholesale improvement of [a] program by court decree, rather 
than in the offices of the Department or the halls of Congress, where programmatic 
improvements are normally made.”
77
  In institutional reform cases the Court has sung a 
similar refrain, insisting that “it is not the role of courts, but that of the political branches, 
to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to comply with the laws and the 
Constitution.”
78
  Separation of powers also animated the early reluctance to bring internal 
agency operations within administrative law’s embrace.  But the concerns then went 
more to the constitutional propriety of having courts regularly review administrative 
actions on direct appeal, as opposed to only through the narrow prerogative writs or 
common law actions.
79
  Moreover, as Tom Merrill has noted, the constitutionality of such 
appellate review was generally accepted during the early decades of the twentieth 
century, leaving pragmatic and political concerns to animate resistance to judicial 




II. BRIDGING THE DIVIDE:  THE ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE   
 
 Identifying the disconnect between administrative law and public administration 
raises two difficult questions.  The first is a normative one:  Should administrative law 
and public administration be more closely linked, or would it be preferable to preserve 
the current divide?  The second follows on the first.  If closer linkage is desirable, how is 
it best achieved? 
 
 A.  The Arguments for Closer Linkage 
 
 Whether to bridge the current divide between administrative law and public 
administration is a close question.  The divide’s longstanding character suggests caution 
before casting it aside.  In particular, good reason exists to resist greater judicial 
involvement in administration, given concerns that judicial review already inhibits 
effective administration and creates poor incentives for agencies.  Nonetheless, as I have 
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argued at length elsewhere, strong arguments exist for tying administrative law and 




 Perhaps the most basic argument in favor derives from the purpose of 
administrative law.  Administrative law aims to both empower and constrain agencies, to 
ensure effective government as well as preserve accountability and prevent arbitrary rule 
through requirements of authorization, participation, transparency, and reasoned 
decisionmaking.
82
  If administrative law is increasingly divorced from the realities of 
governmental functioning, it is less able to perform either role.  Thus, for example, the 
risk that courts will intrude excessively into agencies’ operations if they consider broader, 
systemic processes needs to be balanced against the ways that courts may impede 
agencies’ operations by not considering them.  Having a court review the legality of a 
proposed plan or planning process may prove less burdensome for the agency than 
waiting until the agency has adopted the plan and implemented it, when reversal entails 
opening up a number of specific applications.   Moreover, that the main drivers of 
administrative action fall outside of administrative law’s ambit undermines the legitimacy 
of administrative decisionmaking.
83
  Farber and O’Connell put this point well:  “The risk 
is that administrative law will serve a primarily ceremonial purpose, providing the 
appearance, but not the reality, of public participation and accountability in 
policymaking.  In our view, the goals of transparency, participation, and accountability 




 The danger is not simply that the core aims of administrative law will fail to be 
realized, but also that the actual ways in which administrative government is constrained 
and strengthened will not be recognized.  This raises the danger that an effective source 
of administrative reform will be ignored.  As Mashaw argues “[t]o the extent that we are 
interested in the reform of administrative law in the United States, we might do better to 
operate on the internal law of administration than by ceaselessly tweaking the external 
law.  For many, if not most, agency functions remain structured primarily
 
by agency 
regulations and internal directives.”
85
  Worse, such lack of recognition may lead to 
evisceration of those features that may be critical to effective and accountable 
administration.  Shapiro makes this point with respect to expertise, arguing that 
administrative law’s failure to understand administration has led to a displacement and 
deterioration of expertise and a crowding out of civil servants’ public service and 
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   Moreover, the evisceration of internal adminsitration also 
debilitates external controls, for as Mashaw notes, “[w]ithout internal administrative law, 
contemporary external accountability via political oversight and direction and judicial 
review could not operate.”
87
  It is internal administration—systemic mechanisms for 
planning, prioritysetting, policymaking, resource allocation and managerial oversight and 
supervision—that ensures agencies implement the statutes and instructions their political 





 Recognition of the central role internal administration plays in achieving effective 
and accountable exercise of governmental power also reveals the weakness in the 
separation of powers insistence on excluding administration from constitutional and 
administrative law.  As I have argued, built into our constitutional system is an emphasis 
on internal supervision of delegated governmental power.  This means that separation of 
powers analysis cannot be limited to ensuring that courts do not exceed their proper 
purview.  It also must include ensuring that the executive branch adheres to the 
constitutional duty to supervise, which in turn requires consideration of internal 
administration.  Importantly, this does not necessitate judicial policing of internal 





 B.  ACUS’ Bridging Function 
 
  An important variable to consider is the means by which administrative law and 
administration could be more closely linked.  One possibility is to have courts take 
administration more in assessing whether to have administrative law pay greater heed to 
administration in undertaking judicial review and framing administrative law doctrines.  
Although such a judicial approach has potential, it also risks the kind of significant 
judicial limitation of administrative operational discretion that progressive and New Deal 




 Enter the Administrative Conference.  The Conference is often praised for the way 
that it combines governmental and private perspectives, with a membership that spans 
agency officials, leading representatives of the private and nonprofit regulatory bar, and 
administrative law scholars.
91
  Less appreciated is the way that ACUS simultaneously 
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brings together the worlds of administration and administrative law.  The governmental 
members of ACUS are often top agency lawyers, but they are also high-level agency 
officials who are intimately involved with the wholly internal life of agencies.  By 
contrast, ACUS’ nongovernmental members (perhaps confusingly denominated public 
members) overwhelmingly come from administrative law backgrounds and are deeply 
engaged with the external dimensions of the administrative state.
92
   
 
 ACUS’ projects also span the administrative law-public administration divide, and 
stand out in particular for their emphasis on internal agency functioning.  One 
manifestation of this emphasis is ACUS’ effort to develop agency best practices, which 
aim to encourage administrative self-regulation and internal controls.  It is also clear from 
the subject matter of ACUS reports and recommendations, which in recent years have 
addressed issues such as how agencies consider science, interagency coordination, 
governmental performance assessment, and the practice of centralized regulatory 
review.
93
  Given ACUS’s membership and committee structure, the net effect is to yield a 
number of opportunities for agency administrators and external administrative law 
experts to closely debate specific features of internal agency operations.  Although ACUS 
also considers issues relating to judicial review, internal administration and agency 
processes are its dominant concerns.   
 
 ACUS’ focus on agency administration and process is hardly coincidental.  ACUS 
is the modern incarnation of the famous Attorney General committee whose detailed 
study of actual agency processes underlay development of the APA.  The APA did not 
create a permanent body to undertake ongoing study of administrative procedure, but 
regular calls were made for such an entity and presidents periodically convened 
committees to study administrative process on an ad hoc basis.  These efforts culminated 
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in the birth of ACUS in the Administrative Conference Act of 1965.
94
  That ACUS 
inherited the AG committee’s mantle and focus on how agencies operate is evident from 
its leading statutory mandate:   
 
to provide suitable arrangements through which Federal agencies, assisted 
by outside experts, may cooperatively study mutual problems, exchange 
information, and develop recommendations for action … to the end that 
private rights may be fully protected and regulatory activities and other 





But ACUS’s statutory mandate also makes clear its bridging function, as it also instructs 
ACUS to focus on the more external dimensions of the administrative state by improving 
the effectiveness and efficiency of public participation in, and the laws governing, the 
regulatory process as well as reducing unnecessary litigation.
96
   
 
 ACUS thus already stands as a rare and important exception to the separation of 
administrative law and public administration.  Yet ACUS could also do more to link 
these fields together.  ACUS study more directly how the worlds of administrative law 
and public administration interact and undertake projects that target aspects of 
administrative operation more familiar to public administration scholars than 
administrative lawyers—such as federal personnel systems, agency mechanisms for 
prioritysetting, or internal administrative supervision and management structures.  
Although less immediately tied to specific agency regulatory processes, such background 
features profoundly impact how successful these processes ultimately are.  ACUS could 
also become a venue for suggesting ways to incorporate public administration more into 
administrative law doctrines and judicial review, drawing on its membership’s expertise 
to identify ways that courts could take internal organizational features into account while 
still preserving agency discretion and managerial flexibility.  Finally, ACUS could 
include more policy and public administration experts to complement the administrative 
law emphasis among its public members.
97
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 Happily, a basis exists to think that ACUS may move more in this direction.  As 
part of a 1998 symposium, a leading administrative law scholar envisioned a broader role 
for a revived ACUS, one that would link administrative law and public administration:  
“The “new” Conference … could become a mechanism to connect legal procedures to the 
management issues that underlie them. The artificial distinction between legal and 
management process should give way to a unified concept of public management.”
98
  
That scholar was ACUS’s current chair, Paul Verkuil. 
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